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COMMENTS]
The Eighth Amendment and Original
Intent: Applying the Prohibition Against
Cruel and Unusual Punishments to Prison
Deprivation Cases is Not Beyond the
Bounds of History and Precedent
I. Introduction
The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."' From the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified until
today, "punishment" has referred to the penalty imposed for the
commission of a crime.2 Traditionally, the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments has been applied to methods of execution3 or to
sentences imposed upon convicted criminals.4 In recent years, however,
the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishments to apply to deprivations that were not
inflicted as part of the sentence for a crime.5 Justice Thomas has
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. See Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2483 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
several English language and legal dictionaries of the period).
3. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (second attempt at
electrocution); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (hanging); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136
(1879) (firing squad). In later cases, the constitutionality of the death sentence itself was at issue.
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (fifteen years hard labor imposed
for falsifying government document).
5. See Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993) (exposure of inmate to environmental
tobacco smoke); Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) (use of excessive physical force against
an inmate); Wilson v. Seiter, I l l S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (overall conditions of confinement); Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1984) (double ceiling of inmates); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978)
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characterized this expansion of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause as "beyond all bounds of history and precedent"6 and has
questioned the premise on which the recent expansion of Eighth
Amendment rights is based: That deprivations suffered by a prisoner
constitute punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes, even when the
deprivations have not been inflicted as part of a criminal sentence.7
This Comment will examine whether Justice Thomas's
characterization is correct and thus, whether his criticism is justified.
Section II reviews the historical meaning of the Eighth Amendment Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause. Next, it traces the Supreme Court
jurisprudence interpreting that clause, including the recent trend of the
clause's expansion to include deprivations not inflicted as part of a
criminal sentence. The third section analyzes the expansion of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause for historical and precedential validity
and consistency. Finally, Section IV proposes a method of analyzing
prison deprivation cases that is consistent with the original intent of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and those principles upon which
the Eighth Amendment was based.
II. Tracing the History of the Eighth Amendment and its
Jurisprudence
A. The Original Intent of the Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against
Cruel and Unusual Punishments
The phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" first appeared in the
English Bill of Rights of 1689, which was drafted by Parliament at the
accession of William and Mary The English version appears to have
been directed against punishments unauthorized by statute and beyond the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court, as well as those disproportionate to
the offense involved. 9 However, American drafters, who adopted the
(general conditions of confinement); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (inadequate medical
treatment of an inmate).
6. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2482-83 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Hudson
v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1010 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scaliajoined in both
dissenting opinions.
7. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. at 2483 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1979). See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 852-53 (1969). This
article provides an extensive history of the origin and meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause.
The language of the English Bill of Rights and the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution are virtually identical. Granucci, supra at 855.
9. Granucci, supra note 8, at 860.
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English phraseology in drafting the Eighth Amendment, were primarily
concerned with proscribing "tortures" and other "barbarous methods of
punishment."'"
George Mason, one of Virginia's delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, proposed a bill of rights and a constitution for his state
government which included the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments." Following Virginia's example, eight other states adopted
the clause in their constitutions. 2 The federal government inserted it
into the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and it became the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1791."
According to Justice Thomas, if there is any affirmative historical
evidence as to whether injuries sustained in prison might constitute
"punishment" for Eighth Amendment purposes, that evidence is consistent
with the ordinary meaning of the word.' 4 In other words, when the
founding generation wished to make prison conditions a matter of
constitutional guaranty, they knew how to do so.' 5 In support of this
proposition, Justice Thomas relied on the Delaware Constitution's
analogue of the Eighth Amendment, which provided that "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted; and in the construction of jails a proper regard
shall be had to the health of prisoners."6
There is little doubt that the original drafters of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments were
10. See id. at 841-42. Apparently, George Mason and the framers of the United States
Constitution misinterpreted the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the English
Bill of Rights of 1689, substituting in its place the principles subscribed to by Sir Robert Beale and
Reverend Nathanial Ward. Id. at 860. Beale was a member of Parliament, had studied law at
Oxford, and served as counsel for Puritan ministers who were being deprived of their benefices; in
1853 he published a manuscript entitled A Book against Oaths Ministered in the Courts of
Ecclesiastical Commission. Id. at 848. Ward was a minister and another Puritan attorney who, after
being deprived of his benefice, set sail for Massachusetts; he drafted Body of Liberties which was
enacted into law by that colony in 1641. Id. at 850-51.
11. Granucci, supra note 8, at 840. Section 9 of Mason's Declaration of Rights states: "That
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." This was a verbatim copy of the wording in the English Bill of Rights of
1689. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. By that time, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was considered to be
constitutional boilerplate. "The history of the writing of the first American bills of rights and
constitutions simply does not bear out the presupposition that the process was a diligent or systematic
one. Those documents, which we uncritically exalt, were imitative, deficient, and irrationally
selective... " Id. at 840 n.8.
14. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. at 2483 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 2483-84.
16. Id. (citing DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, Art. I, § Xl (1792) (emphasis added)).
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primarily concerned with the use of tortures and other barbarous methods
of punishment. 7 Thus, Justice Thomas correctly asserted that the
Framers did not contemplate that the Eighth Amendment would be
applied to the conditions of confinement of those properly convicted of
crimes." Whether the Eighth Amendment has been improperly
expanded beyond the bounds of history and precedent to apply to those
conditions today, however, is best determined after reviewing the United
States Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
B. Eighth Amendment Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Following the adoption of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, both state and federal jurists accepted the view that it prohibits
the more inhumane methods of punishment.' 9 Because the United States
did not resort to the same barbarous punishments as Stuart England, the
clause was rarely invoked in court.2" Attempts to extend the clause to
cover punishments that were disproportionate to the offense were rejected
throughout the nineteenth century, and therefore, commentators believed
that the clause was obsolete.2'
The Supreme Court first applied the Eighth Amendment by
comparing challenged methods of execution to concededly inhuman
17. There is sufficient commentary to establish the interpretation which the Framers placed on
the phrase "cruel and unusual." In the Massachusetts convention of 1788, an objection was made
to the lack of limitations on the methods of federal punishments: "[Congress is] nowhere restrained
from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments and annexing them to crimes; and there
is no constitutional check of them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild
instruments of their discipline." Granucci, supra note 8, at 841 (emphasis in original) (citing 2 J.
ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 111 (2d ed. 1881)).
In the Virginia convention, Patrick Henry was a vehement objector to the lack of a bill of
rights. Fearing the use of "tortures" and "barbarous" punishments, he specifically complained of the
lack of a prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Granucci, supra note 8, at 841 (citing 3
ELLIOT, supra, at 447-48). In the same discussion, George Mason, drafter of the Virginia Declaration
of Rights, expressed his interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as one which
included torture within its prohibition. Granucci, supra note 8, at 841-42 (citing 3 ELLIOT, supra,
at 452).
18. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. at 2482-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Hudson v. McMillian,
112 S. Ct. at 1010 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
19. Granucci, supra note 8, at 842. It appears that decapitation, the rack, or any torturous
means of extorting a confession were among the methods of punishment that concerned those who
supported the Eighth Amendment. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (citing 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 694 (8th ed.
1927)); see Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law,
79 HARV. L. REV. 635 (1966).
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techniques of punishment.22 The mode of execution was at issue, not
the constitutionality of the death sentence itself, and the criterion used to
evaluate the challenged mode was its similarity to torture and other
barbarous methods.2  Since then, the Court has not confined the
prohibition embodied in the Eighth Amendment to only those barbarous
methods of punishment that were generally outlawed in the 18th Century;
instead, the Court has interpreted the Amendment "in a flexible and
dynamic manner. '0 4  The meaning of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause has not been fixed, but has been allowed to grow "as
public opinion has become enlightened by a humane justice.
25
Apparently, the Court has recognized that the vitality of the Constitution
depends on the application of its principles to a much wider set of
circumstances than those which first gave rise to those principles.26
The expansion of the Eighth Amendment began in 1910 when the
Court, in Weems v. United States,27 rejected for the first time the
proposition that the Eighth Amendment reaches only punishments that are
inhuman, barbarous or torturous. 2' The Amendment was not scrutinized
again in any significant manner until the late 1950s and 1960s. In 1958,
the Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment barred the use of
22. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) ("Punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death .... ); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879) ("[lt is safe to
affirm that punishments of torture ... and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are
forbidden by that amendment .... ").
23. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 170; see In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447; Wilkerson, 99 U.S.
at 136. See also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (holding that a
second attempt at electrocution did not violate the Eighth Amendment, because it was "an
unforeseeable accident" and "[t]here was no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain involved in the
proposed execution.").
24. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
25. Id. (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 378); see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,429-30 (1972)
(Powell, J., dissenting); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
26. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
27. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
28. 217 U.S. at 368. In Weems, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the Philippine
punishment of cadena temporal (imprisonment for a term less than life) for the crime of falsifying
an official document. At the time, cadena temporal included imprisonment for at least 12 years and
one day, in chains, and at hard and painful labor; the loss of many basic civil rights; and subjection
to lifetime surveillance. The Court acknowledged the possibility that "the cruelty of pain" may be
present in the challenged punishment. Weems, 217 U.S. at 366. It did not rely on that factor,
however, for it rejected the proposition that the Eighth Amendment reaches only punishments that
are "inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like." Id. at 368. Rather, the Court focused on the lack
of proportion between the crime and the offense, concluding that "a precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense." Id. at 366-67. That
decision was hailed as a triumph of enlightenment over history. See Note, What is Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 24 HARV. L. REv. 54 (1910).
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denationalization as a punishment,29 and in 1962, the Court determined
that the Eighth Amendment imposed substantive limits on what could be
made criminal and punished."
Later, the Court struggled to, but could not, resolve the issue of
whether the punishment of death was per se cruel and unusual and thus
violative of the Eighth Amendment.3 ' In Gregg v. Georgia, 2 however,
the Court eventually concluded that the death penalty was not per se
unconstitutional. 3 The Court in Gregg held that a penalty may not be
excessive 34 and that, when a form of punishment in the abstract is under
consideration, the inquiry into excessiveness has two aspects. 35  First,
the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain.36 Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion
to the severity of the crime.37
In 1976, the same year as the Gregg decision, Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence reached a pivotal turning point. The Supreme Court, in
Estelle v. Gamble,38 first applied the Eighth Amendment to a deprivation
that was not specifically part of the sentence, but was suffered during
imprisonment.39  The Court held that deliberate indifference by prison
29. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). In determining its constitutionality, the Court first
concluded that denationalization was "punishment" and thus subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 97.
30. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In Robinson, the Court found it
unconstitutional for a state to make narcotic drug addiction a criminal offense, holding, in effect, that
it is "cruel and unusual" to impose any punishment at all for the mere status of addiction. Robinson
is also often cited for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment is applicable to the States by way
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 666.
31. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist would have held that capital punishment is not unconstitutional per se.
Justices Brennan and Marshall would have reached the opposite conclusion. While agreeing that the
statutes then before the Court were invalid as applied, Justices Douglas, Stewart and White left open
the question of whether such punishment may ever be imposed.
32. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
33. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (stating that "the
death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances
of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed
in reaching the decision to impose it.").
34. Id. at 173.
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 392-93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879).
37. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion;
dictum); Weems, 217 U.S. at 367.
38. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
39. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97. In this case, an inmate sued the state corrections department's
medical director and two correctional officials, claiming that they subjected him to cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment for inadequate treatment of a back injury allegedly
sustained while he was engaged in prison work. Id.
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personnel to a prisoner's serious illness or injury constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment contravening the Eighth Amendment.40 The Court
rejected the inmate's claim, however, on the ground that the treating
physician against whom the complaint had been made did not have a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.4
After significantly expanding the Eighth Amendment's scope in
Estelle, in Ingraham v. Wright"2 the Court declined to apply the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments to corporal punishment
in public schools, distinguishing between the prisoner and the
schoolchild."3 Prison brutality, the Court observed, is part of the total
punishment to which the individual is being subjected for his crime and,
as such, is a proper subject for Eighth Amendment scrutiny."4 The
Court recognized, however, that the Eighth Amendment only protects the
incarcerated criminal against the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain."5
In 1981, Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence reached another threshold
in Rhodes v. Chapman,"6 a case in which the Court first considered the
limitation that the Amendment imposes upon the conditions in which a
40. Id. at 106. Only the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" is proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 104; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.). The Court concluded that a prisoner advancing such a claim must, at a minimum,
allege "deliberate indifference" to "serious" medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
Estelle relied in large measure on the earlier case, Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459 (1947), which did not involve a prison deprivation case, but an effort to subject a prisoner
to a second electrocution after the first attempt failed by reason of a malfunction in the electric chair.
329 U.S. at 459. Justice Reed, writing for a plurality of the Court, emphasized that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited "the wanton,infliction of pain." Id. at 463 (emphasis added). Because the
first attempt had been thwarted by an "unforeseeable accident," the Court held that the officials
lacked the culpable state of mind necessary for the punishment to be regarded as "cruel," regardless
of the actual suffering inflicted. Id. at 464.
41. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107.
42. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
43. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671. Even this case, which seemingly involved a straightforward
constitutional issue, was decided by a 5-4 vote, demonstrating the highly controversial nature of the
expansion of the Eighth Amendment beyond its traditional boundaries. Justices White, Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens dissented. Justice White's dissenting opinion emphasized that the language
of the Constitution did not limit nor modify the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments,
and therefore, that the Eighth Amendment was designed to prohibit all inhumane or barbaric
punishments, no matter what the nature of the offense for which the punishment was imposed. Id.
at 685. Justice White also argued that Estelle, decided earlier in the same term, demonstrated that
the applicability of the Eighth Amendment was not confined to criminal punishments, since Estelle
held that the Eighth Amendment also applied to the deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical
needs which is merely misconduct by a prison official. Id. at 688 n.4.
44. Id. at 669 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 915 (5th Cir. 1976)).
45. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669-70.
46. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
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State may confine those convicted of crimes.47 Rejecting the inmates'
contention that double ceiling constituted cruel and unusual
punishment,48 the Court concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate
that double ceiling inflicted unnecessary or wanton pain or was grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crimes warranting imprisonment.49
After Rhodes, the Eighth Amendment standard for prison conditions
was that prison conditions cannot deny an inmate the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities, or they are considered to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment.50  The obvious corollary to this standard,
however, is that conditions which are not considered to be cruel and
unusual by contemporary standards are not unconstitutional, and to the
extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of
the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society.5
The next case facing the Court, Whitley v. Albers,52 involved
violence by prison officials in response to a riot by inmates.53  In
Whitley, the Court held that a guard did not violate the Eighth
Amendment when he shot an inmate during a prison riot, because the
guard had not acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.54 In
47. 452 U.S. at 344-45. Here, cellmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, a maximum
security prison, brought a class action against state officials seeking relief and alleging that the
lodging of two inmates in a single cell ("double ceiling") constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 340. Rhodes was the first case in which the parties
disputed whether the conditions of confinement at a particular prison actually constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. In a previous case, the state prison administrators did not dispute the district
court's conclusion that the conditions in two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).
48. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 339.
49. Id. at 348. More specifically, the Court found that the considerations on which the lower
court relied amounted to a theory that double ceiling inflicted pain, but that the conditions of
confinement did not rise to the level of the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain that violates
the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 348-49.
50. Id. at 347.
51. Id.
52. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
53. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 312. Whitley made it clear that Rhodes had not eliminated the
subjective component of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Wilson v. Seiter, 11I S. Ct.
2321, 2324 (1991).
54. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 312. The general requirement that an Eighth Amendment claimant
allege and prove the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain should be applied with due regard for
differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection is lodged. Id. at
320. The Court justified its deviation from the "deliberate indifference" standard of Estelle v.
Gamble, because in the context presented in that case, the state's responsibility to attend to the
medical needs of prisoners did not, nor would it ordinarily, clash with other equally important
governmental responsibilities. Id. But, in the context of quelling a prison uprising, prison officials
must take into account the very real threats that the unrest presents to inmates and prison officials
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particular, Whitley determined that in the prison riot context, officials
violate the Eighth Amendment when they act maliciously and sadistically
with the purpose of causing harm." Accordingly, as the Court
reasoned, conduct that does not purport to be punishment must involve
more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety
if it is to be deemed cruel and unusual punishment."
In 1991, the Court synthesized its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
in Wilson v. Seiter," affirming that both the objective and subjective
components of the Eighth Amendment must be satisfied in order to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.5" Wilson, thus, extended the
deliberate indifference standard first articulated in Estelle to claims
concerning conditions of confinement.59
In 1992, in Hudson v. McMillian," the Court removed the
objective component of the Eighth Amendment under certain
circumstances, holding that the use of excessive force against an inmate
may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even though no serious
injury is suffered.6  Whenever prison officials maliciously and
sadistically use force to cause harm, the Court held that contemporary
standards of decency are violated, whether or not significant injury is
evident.62 Thus, the Court determined that the appropriate inquiry
alike, in addition to the possible harm to inmates against whom the force might be used. Id.
55. Id. at 320-21; Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.), cert.
denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
56. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. Inadvertence or error in good faith are not sufficient to make
one's conduct rise to the level of the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. Id.
57. !11 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
58. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2321. In Wilson, an inmate alleged that the poor conditions of his
confinement per se amounted to cruel and unusual punishment and argued that he should not be
required to establish that the officials had acted culpably. Id. at 2322-23. The Court rejected the
argument, emphasizing that an inmate who seeks to establish that prison deprivation amounts to cruel
and unusual punishment must satisfy both the objective and subjective components of the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 2324.
59. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 999 (1992). Strictly speaking, Estelle was not a
conditions of confinement case; it was a complaint against inadequate medical attention by a prison
official to an inmate's injury.
60. 112 S. Ct 995 (1992).
61. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 995. In Hudson, an inmate alleged that security officers violated the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments by placing him in handcuffs and
shackles, taking him out of his cell, and punching him in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach while
holding him, causing minor bruises and swelling to his face, mouth, and lip. Id. at 997.
62. Id. at 1000. Under the Whitley approach, the extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one
factor that may suggest whether the use of force was thought to be necessary under the circumstances
or instead was such a wanton and unjustified infliction of harm that it must be considered tantamount
to a knowing willingness that it occur. Id. at 999. The Court did concede, however, that not every
malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. Id. at 1000. The Eighth
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whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force
in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is that set out
in Whitley: whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.63
Recently, the Court relaxed the objective component of the Eighth
Amendment in another way, holding that it applied to a prisoner's risk of
injury from environmental tobacco smoke (ETS).64 The case was
remanded to the district court to give the inmate the opportunity to prove
both the objective and subjective elements necessary for an Eighth
Amendment violation.65 With respect to the objective factor, the inmate
was required to show that he, himself, was being exposed to unreasonably
high levels of ETS.66 With respect to the subjective factor, the inmate
was required to show that prison officials showed deliberate indifference
to his exposure.67
The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence certainly has
come a long way since the days of deciding whether a particular method
of execution was cruel and unusual. In recent years, the Court has
struggled with the application of Eighth Amendment principles as the
context of the cases before it has changed. Now, an Eighth Amendment
prison claim has both an objective component, whether the deprivation
was sufficiently serious, and a subjective component, whether the officials
acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.6' Accordingly, the
eighteenth century commentators who thought that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause was dead would be shocked not only at its revival,
but also at its growth and expansion in the last several decades, as would
the Framers of the Constitution. Whether they would be dismayed
depends on whether or not there is a justification for this recent trend.
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment necessarily excludes from
constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of
a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000.
63. Id. at 999.
64. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993). The Court held that an inmate stated a valid
cause of action under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause when he alleged that prison
officials, with deliberate indifference, exposed him voluntarily to ETS which posed an unreasonable
risk to his health. Id. at 2481.
65. Id. at 2481-82.
66. Id. at 2482. In addition, the prisoner had to show that the risk of which he complained was
not one that today's society chooses to tolerate. Id.
67. McKinney, 113 S. CL at 2482. The prison officials' deliberate indifference was to be
determined in light of the prison authorities' current attitudes and conduct, which may have changed
considerably since the judgment of the court of appeals. Id.
68. Wilson v. Seiter, Il1 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991).
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III. A Methodology for Applying the Eighth Amendment to Prison
Deprivation Cases within the Bounds of History and Precedent
At first glance, the preceding history of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence seems like a very natural and humane way for the law to
evolve. But when one attempts to resolve the question of whether the
Eighth Amendment was designed to protect inmates from the conditions
of their confinement, the answer is not clearly discernible from the
Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. As its history
indicates, the original intent of the Eighth Amendment certainly did not
contemplate such protection.69
A closer analysis will reveal that confinement in a prison is a form
of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.
The Court's reasoning, however, has made Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence more confusing than is necessary, and its most recent
decisions extending the protection of the Amendment to minor injuries7"
and the mere risk of deprivation7' have exceeded the bounds of history
and precedent. While protecting inmates from inhumane conditions of
confinement is a desirable goal, the Court's primary duty is to interpret
the Constitution in a manner consistent with its text and history. As will
be demonstrated, the two need not be mutually exclusive.
A. The Need to Define Punishment for Eighth Amendment Purposes:
A Limited Judicial Role is Appropriate
As the historical background of the Eighth Amendment indicated,
when the Amendment was ratified, the word "punishment" referred to the
penalty imposed for the commission of a crime.72 That is also the
primary definition of the word today. As a legal term of art,
"punishment" has always meant a fine, penalty, or confinement inflicted
upon a person by the authority of the law and the judgment and sentence
of a court for some crime or offense committed by him.73 While it is
appropriate to let the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society"'74 dictate what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment, it is inappropriate for the Court to let contemporary
69. See supra section II.A.
70. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
71. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993).
72. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. at 2483 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing several English language and
legal dictionaries of the period); see also Granucci, supra note 8, at 840-44.
73. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. at 2483; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990).
74. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion).
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notions of decency dictate the meaning of punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.
If the Eighth Amendment's reach is expanded to non-punishments,
the Court will have ignored its own wise admonitions about its limited
role.75 Previously, the Court warned that it must be cautious when
interpreting the Eighth Amendment so that it would not become the
ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibility across the
nation.76 The Court realized that any decision by the Court that a given
punishment is impermissible under the Eighth Amendment cannot be
reversed without amending the Constitution, which effectively terminates
the ability of the people to express their preference through the normal
democratic processes.77
B. The Court has Avoided Directly Confronting the Issue of What
Constitutes Punishment
To justify its expansion of the reach of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, the Court has consistently cited general principles
of early Eighth Amendment cases, none of which applied to prison
deprivations.7 Estelle v. Gamble79 relied on earlier cases which had
held that the Eighth Amendment proscribed more than physically
barbarous punishments."0 The Court's discussion of the Amendment's
history in Estelle was only cursory, and it amounted to a judicial side-
stepping of the crux of the issue at hand: whether the Eighth
Amendment should be applied to prison deprivations not meted out as
punishment by a statute or judge." Although the Court purported to
rely upon its previous decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment, none
of the cases it cited held that the Eighth Amendment applied to prison
deprivations or even addressed a claim that it did. 2
75. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 (1981) (stating that Supreme Court must
proceed cautiously in making an Eighth Amendment judgment).
76. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968).
77. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176.
78. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 171 ("[A] principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth. Thus the Clause forbidding cruel and unusual
punishments is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice.") (citations, internal quotations omitted); Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. at 102 ("The Amendment embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,
humanity, and decency ... against which we must evaluate penal measures.") (citations, internal
quotations omitted).
79. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
80. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 171, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
at 100-01, and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 373).
81. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. at 2484 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (citations omitted). All of the cited cases involved challenges to a sentence imposed for
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Estelle relied most heavily on the Eighth Circuit opinion in Jackson
v. Bishop 3 which, like Estelle itself, simply asserted that the Eighth
Amendment applies to prison deprivations.8 4 In Jackson, the Eighth
Circuit failed to clarify the meaning of punishment under the Eighth
Amendment, 5 and as previously indicated, that definition is the crucial
issue in these types of cases. The court avoided the controversy by
refusing to draw any meaningful distinction between punishment imposed
by way of a sentence statutorily prescribed and punishment imposed for
prison disciplinary purposes; it merely asserted that the Eighth
Amendment's proscription seemingly applied to both. 6 However,
distinguishing these two types of cases is critical to make any sensible
analysis under the Eighth Amendment.
In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Court acknowledged that "cruel and
unusual" applies to the constitutional limitation upon punishments."
However, the Court failed to directly confront the issue of whether
conditions of confinement are really punishment within the meaning of
the Eighth Amendment in that opinion. Relying on Hutto v. Finney,"8
the Court unconvincingly found that confinement in a prison is a form of
punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards.89
Hutto cites no authority for this proposition, though. 90  Therefore,
a criminal offense. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1979), Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947), In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), and Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130
(1879) were death penalty cases. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), involved a challenge
to a sentence imposed for the crime of falsifying a document, and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958), presented the question of whether revocation of citizenship amounts to cruel and unusual
punishment upon those who desert the military.
83. 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (Blackmun, J.).
84. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. at 2485. While sitting on the Eight Circuit bench, Justice Blackmun
wrote the opinion in Jackson. After drafting the opinion, Justice Blackmun moved up to the
Supreme Court and was sitting on the Supreme Court when the Court decided Estelle v. Gamble.
The text or history of the Eighth Amendment was not adequately discussed in either case.
85. Jackson, 404 F.2d at 571.
86. Id. at 580-81. The Jackson case can be distinguished from Estelle in that the plaintiff in
Jackson challenged the use of the "strap" as a disciplinary measure in Arkansas prisons. Arguably,
this action calls for the application of the Eighth Amendment, because it is sufficiently analogous to
imposing a sentence for a criminal law violation. Furthermore, it is quite different from a claim for
inadequate medical care or other condition of confinement. See McKinney, 113 S. Ct. at 2485 n.2
(dissenting opinion).
87. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 337. Specifically, the court asserted, "The Eighth Amendment, in only
three words, imposes the constitutional limitation upon punishments: they cannot be 'cruel and
unusual."' Id. at 345.
88. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
89. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. at 685).
90. See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685. Not only did the Hutto case cite no authority for the
proposition, but the Court, in Hutto, acknowledged that the "[p]etitioners do not challenge this
proposition; nor do they disagree with the District Court's original conclusion that conditions in
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although it did not review the history of the Amendment nor adequately
address the issue, the Court relied on the same general principles cited in
Estelle and nonetheless concluded that these principles apply when the
conditions of confinement compose the punishment at issue.91
C. The Subjective Component: Distinguishing Conditions of
Confinement Cases from Prison Official Misconduct Cases Makes
Sense
To justify extending the reach of the Eighth Amendment to prison
deprivations cases, the Court in Estelle introduced the state of mind
requirement of deliberate indifference. 92 Justice Stevens, who dissented
in Estelle, opposed this requirement from its inception.93 Asserting that
intent should not be a necessary part of an Eighth Amendment violation,
Justice Stevens thought that the issue of whether the constitutional
standard had been violated should turn on the character of the punishment
rather than the motivation of the individual who inflicted it. 94 This
debate has continued through even the most recent cases.
9 5
In Wilson v. Seiter,96 Justice Scalia's majority opinion emphasized
that the source of the intent requirement is the Eighth Amendment itself.
If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the
statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed
to the inflicting officer before the pain can qualify as punishment.97
Justice White's concurring opinion found that the majority's intent
requirement was not only inconsistent with precedent, but also impossible
to apply in many cases.98 Justice White made an important point when
he criticized the majority's lack of guidance on the question of whose
intent should be examined.99 Instead of focusing on the conditions of
confinement as the punishment in question, the Court should consider the
confinement itself. By doing this, the Court will not be expanding the
Eighth Amendment beyond its original intent, because the confinement
Arkansas' prisons, including its punitive isolation cells, constituted cruel and unusual punishment."
Id.
91. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
92. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105 (1976).
93. Id. at 116 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 116.
95. See cases cited supra note 5.
96. 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (1991).
97. Id. at 2325.




would have been formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the
sentencing judge.'00
By failing to distinguish the analysis used in cases in which inmates
contest various conditions of confinement from that used in those in
which inmates decry the infliction of pain by prison officials, the Court
is missing a somewhat obvious but critical point.' In the former
cases, the conditions of confinement are necessarily part of the
punishment imposed by the state,0 2 and as such the state is the actor
whose intent should be considered. Because the intent of the state to
imprison one of its inmates is always present, the subjective component
of the Eighth Amendment will always be satisfied in a conditions of
confinement case.
In Hudson v. McMillian, 3  the Court left open the issue of
whether isolated and unauthorized acts by prison officials are punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. l" This will be a critical question in
future cases of this type. Several circuit courts have held that the use of
force by prison officials is beyond the scope of punishment prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment where the dispute was a personal one between the
official and a prisoner and was against prison policy. 5 Following the
logic applied above, such a holding makes sense because the state in such
a case does not intend to inflict the pain involved as a part of the
prisoner's punishment. In the past, the Court has looked to the intent of
the individual prison official involved to satisfy the intent requirement,
whether the deprivation involved conditions of confinement or excessive
force by prison guards.0 6  As the previous discussion indicates,
100. Id. at 2325.
101. The majority opinion of the Court in Wilson discussed the state of mind required to satisfy
the subjective component of the Eighth Amendment. The majority saw no significant distinction
between claims alleging inadequate medical care and those alleging inadequate conditions of
confinement. "[T]he medical care a prisoner receives is just as much a 'condition' of his
confinement as the food he is fed, the clothes he is issued, the temperature he is subjected to in his
cell, and the protection he is afforded against other inmates." Wilson, Ill S. Ct. at 2326-27.
102. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 669. "Prison brutality . . . is part of the total
punishment to which the individual is being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject
for Eighth Amendment scrutiny." Id. (internal quotations, internal citations omitted).
103. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
104. Id. at 1001-02.
105. See id. at 1001; George v. Evans, 633 F.2d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding that a
single, unauthorized assault by a guard does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Johnson
v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that a spontaneous attack by a guard is cruel
and unusual, but does not fit the ordinary concept of punishment), cert. denied sub noma. John v.
Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). But see Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985)
(determining that a guard's decision to supplement a prisoner's official punishment by beating him
is punishment), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986).
106. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337
99 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1995
however, it is logical to separate these two types of cases, and in keeping
within the history and text of the Eighth Amendment, it is appropriate to
exclude isolated and unauthorized acts by prison officials from the scope
of the Eighth Amendment's protection. °7
D. "Serious Deprivation ": The Objective Component Must Be
Enforced
Having determined that the requirement of intent is necessarily met
in a conditions of confinement case,0 8 courts cannot provide relief for
every conditions of confinement case. A prisoner must meet an objective
standard before the courts can grant relief under the Eighth
Amendment.'0 9 The appropriate objective requirement of the Eighth
Amendment is embodied in the Court's conclusions that the Constitution
does not mandate comfortable prisons"0  and that only those
deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities
are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment
violation."' To be deemed a violation of the Amendment, the
contested condition or conditions must deprive the inmate of a single,
identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise."' Thus,
nothing so amorphous as "overall conditions" can rise to the level of
cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single
human need exists."
3
In determining what conditions deny an inmate the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities, the Court should adhere to its own
admonitions" 4 and defer to the legislative determination of the States
as to what conditions their prisons must conform."' Prison conditions
(1981).
107. The Eighth Amendment is not the only recourse for prisoners. The inmates would still be
able to seek redress for the acts of prison officials under state prisoner grievance procedures or state
tort law.
108. See supra Section II.C.
109. Wilson v. Seiter, 11 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349
(1981).
110. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349.
11. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
112. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327.
113. Id.
114. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 (1981); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174,
176 (1979).
115. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174. The joint opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens strongly
supported this proposition with the caveat that the Eighth Amendment, as a restraint upon the
exercise of legislative power, naturally subjects legislative decisions to judicial review. Id.
Legislative measures adopted by a representative body provide an important means of ascertaining
contemporary values, however, those judgments alone cannot be determinative, because the Eighth
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are allowed to be restrictive and even harsh, as they are part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." 6
To a certain extent, states should be allowed to impose restrictive and
harsh conditions upon its inmates. Then, it would be understood that an
inmate is intentionally subjected to the conditions of the prisons, as they
are permitted to exist in that jurisdiction.
Controversy exists today as to the amount of harm that may be
inflicted upon prisoners before the Eighth Amendment affords them some
protection. In Hudson v. McMillian, the Court granted certiorari to
determine whether "significant injury" is required in order to establish a
violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause."" The Court
gave two reasons for refusing to fix the standard required to establish
sufficient harm in a deprivation case. First, since the Eighth Amendment
requires that a claimant allege and prove unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain, the Court must have due regard for differences in the
kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection has been
lodged." 8  Second, because the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishments derives meaning from evolving standards
of decency, there can be few absolute limitations."1
9
Concluding that the objective component of an Eighth Amendment
claim is contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency,
the Court held that, in the excessive force context, when prison officials
maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary
standards of decency always are violated whether or not significant injury
is evident. 2 The Court also excluded from constitutional recognition
de minimis uses of physical force so long as such force is not of the sort
repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'' In dicta, the Court
indicated that "extreme deprivations" would be required to make out a
Amendment was intended to safeguard individuals from legislative power. Id. at 174 n.19.
Therefore, since the Amendment would bar some punishments, whether legislatively approved or not,
the Eighth Amendment imposes an obligation on the judiciary to judge the constitutionality of certain
forms of punishment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313-14 (1972) (White, J., concurring); id.
at 433 (Powell, J., dissenting).
116. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
117. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 998 (1992).
118. Id. at 1000; Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).
119. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346.
120. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000.
121. Id.
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conditions of confinement claim' or a claim based on medical
needs.12
The decision in Hudson departed company from history and
precedent. The cases preceding it established that prisoners seeking to
prove that they have been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment
must always show a serious deprivation.' 24 Despite the Hudson
majority's assertion to the contrary, 2 ' Wilson v. Seiter made explicit the
serious deprivation requirement, describing the inquiry mandated by the
objective component as whether the deprivation was "sufficiently
serious.' 26 The Court's conclusion in Hudson, however, rested on the
notion that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of "pain" rather than injury. 27 Thus, in the context of claims
alleging the excessive use of physical force, the majority asserted that the
serious deprivation requirement would be satisfied by no serious
deprivation at all. 21 If the suggestion that these types of claims should
be excluded from the Eighth Amendment's protection was followed, these
types of cases would be appropriately dismissed.
Wilson notwithstanding, the Court has continued to relax the
requirement that there be a serious deprivation in order to establish an
Eighth Amendment violation. In Helling v. McKinney, a conditions of
confinement case, the Court also departed from the serious deprivation
standard, holding that the Eighth Amendment applies to a prisoner's mere
risk of injury.'29 With respect to the objective factor, the inmate now
is required to show on remand that he, himself, was being exposed to
unreasonably high levels of ETS and that society considers the risk to be
so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose
anyone unwillingly to such a risk.'3 For the same reasons as noted
122. Id. "Because routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Id. (internal
quotations omitted; internal citations omitted).
123. Id. "Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health
care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if
those needs are serious." Id. (internal quotations omitted; internal citations omitted).
124. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1010 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1001.
126. Id. at 1007; Wilson v. Seiter, III S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991) (emphasis added).
127. See Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 1007.
129. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2481 (1993). Risk of serious deprivation is not the
equivalent of serious deprivation.
130. Id. at 2482.
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above, this decision goes beyond the history and precedent of the Eighth
Amendment and therefore should be reversed.
IV. Conclusion
In its desire to protect inmates from inhumane conditions of
confinement, the Supreme Court has extended the protection of the
Eighth Amendment to those conditions. Although the original intent of
the Eighth Amendment did not contemplate the protection of prisoners
from the conditions of confinement, confinement in a prison itself is a
form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment
standards. The Court has determined that both a subjective and an
objective standard must be used to determine whether an Eighth
Amendment violation is present.
The subjective standard requires an intent to deprive the inmate of
a specific human need. Confinement by its very nature is an intentional
deprivation by the state of various liberties. Because the conditions of
confinement are necessarily part of the punishment of confinement, they
satisfy the subjective requirement and thus, are subject to the scrutiny of
the Court under the Eighth Amendment. The Court's reasoning,
however, has focused on the intent of individual prison officials, making
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence more confusing than is necessary. By
focusing on the state's intent to imprison, conditions of confinement can
be brought under the Eighth Amendment without expanding the
Amendment beyond its natural scope.
The Court has left open the question whether the isolated and
unauthorized acts of prison officials constitute punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. By adopting an approach which limits the Eighth
Amendment's protection to those deprivations considered by the state to
be part of the punishment of confinement, this question should be
answered in the negative. Because these isolated and unauthorized acts
are not intended as part of the punishment of confinement, it would be
inappropriate to consider them under the Eighth Amendment.
The objective standard requires a serious deprivation before the
Eighth Amendment will provide protection. In its most recent decisions,
the Court has strayed from this standard, failing to interpret the
Constitution in a manner consistent with its history and precedent. To
prevent further devolution, the Court must reaffirm the principle that only
serious deprivations deserve scrutiny under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
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